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Arkansas leaders, like their 
counterparts in other states, have 
embarked on a planned course to 
transform the state’s  
juvenile justice system.
Introduction
Many in Arkansas have been working 
together over the past several years 
to reform the state’s juvenile justice 
system. Leaders in state government—
in collaboration with judges, service 
providers, advocates, probation staff, 
youth justice experts, and community 
leaders—are successfully shepherding 
an antiquated youth justice system 
into the 21st century. 
Much has been learned from research 
and practical experience about what 
works, and what does not, to help 
youth stay away from crime. For 
decades studies have shown, and 
experts have repeatedly advised, in 
Arkansas and around the nation, that 
placing youth in secure institutional 
confinement is not an effective way 
to change the behavior of youth who 
break the law.1 Institutional care and 
secure confinement are, in fact, often 
harmful.2 
In addition, the cost of secure 
confinement to taxpayers far exceeds 
what it costs to invest in community-
based services proven to be more 
effective at preventing future criminal 
behavior.3
Recognizing these principles, and 
that youth who violate the law can 
be “more cheaply and effectively 
managed through programs that 
supervise and monitor them in 
the neighborhoods where they 
live,”4 Arkansas leaders, like their 
counterparts in other states, have 
embarked on a planned course to 
transform the state’s juvenile justice 
system.  They aim to ensure that 
youth are not inappropriately or 
unnecessarily held in costly secure 
confinement, and that taxpayer dollars 
are spent wisely on services that 
actually produce good outcomes for 
youth, families, and the community. 
In just a short period of time, 
Arkansas has achieved significant 
positive results from reform efforts. 
From 2008 to 2011, commitments 
to state custody have been reduced 
by 20%, including those for low-
level, non-dangerous youthful 
misbehaviors;5 the average length 
of stay in state residential treatment 
centers has been shortened by 19%; 
and the number of beds at the state’s 
largest juvenile secure facility, the 
Arkansas Juvenile Assessment and 
Treatment Center, was reduced by 
30%. The number of youth committed 
annually to the juvenile justice system 
who are also the responsibility of 
the state’s child welfare system, the 
so-called “dual jurisdiction” kids, has 
been reduced by almost 75%.6
The state, moreover, has expanded 
its investment in new community-
based services for youth and families, 
including new programs that were 
not available prior to the reform 
movement. Importantly, these new 
services are “evidence-based,” 
meaning the program model has been 
tested by researchers and proven to 
achieve positive results. 
In 2011, funding for the expansion 
of community services in Arkansas 
included dollars that were reinvested 
from savings earned from the 
decreased use of secure residential 
beds. 
Reform has also resulted in better 
management of state services for 
youth. There is greater continuity in 
agency leadership, and state facilities 
used for secure confinement provide 
safer conditions for youth than existed 
in the past. 
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In the same period that these changes 
have occurred, youth crime in 
Arkansas has decreased, as indicated 
by declining youth arrest rates. This 
suggests reduced use of secure 
custody has not negatively impacted 
public safety. 
Those who have diligently worked 
together to bring about these changes 
have much of which to be proud.
But the road to sustainable reform 
is long. As stakeholders in Arkansas 
would be the first to observe, there 
are many stones in the path ahead 
that remain to be firmly laid. 
This report is offered to shine a light 
on the collective efforts underway 
in Arkansas to transform the state’s 
juvenile justice system. It describes 
the work that has been done to build 
reform over the past four years under 
the steady and skilled stewardship 
of Ron Angel, Director of the Division 
of Youth Services (DYS). It also 
suggests additional changes in policy 
and practices that might further 
“revolutionize” youth services, as is 
called for in the division’s strategic 
reform plan.7
The first section of the report 
discusses the state of juvenile justice 
in Arkansas prior to the start of reform 
efforts. The second section describes 
the building blocks of reform, including 
the architecture of the reform process 
and the essential elements of specific 
reform initiatives. The last section 
provides hypothetical scenarios that 
suggest some of the ways current 
practices could be changed in order to 
further DYS’ efforts to safely reduce 
the number of youth held in secure 
custody. These scenarios are offered 
to aid the discussions among Arkansas 
policymakers and stakeholders about 
ways to further the goals of reform in 
the future. 
The Past
Over the past several decades the 
Arkansas Division of Youth Services 
(DYS) was, like so many other youth 
service agencies around the country, 
awash in chaos and controversy.  
Throughout the last decade of the 20th 
century, and into the first part of the 
21st, the best the state had to offer 
its troubled youth were overcrowded, 
understaffed, and dangerous juvenile 
prisons, with far too little rehabilitative 
programming. 
An inadequate array of community-
based supports and programs to 
address the problems underlying a 
child’s delinquent behavior resulted, 
over time, in the excessive use 
of secure confinement and an 
overreliance on state commitments. 
The conditions in the overcrowded 
state facilities became intolerable 
and unsafe, and remained so for 
decades. Youth were being physically 
and emotionally hurt by the trauma 
of being locked away, and few were 
getting the rehabilitative services they 
needed. 
No laws, policies, or incentives existed 
to reserve costly state-funded secure 
beds for only the most serious and 
violent youthful offenders. As a result, 
juvenile prisons became overcrowded 
with youth who experts repeatedly 
concluded weren’t really dangerous 
but needed more supports in the 
community, rather than confinement.  
As a headline in the Arkansas
Juvenile prisons became overcrowded 
with youth who experts repeatedly 
concluded weren’t really dangerous 
but needed more supports in the 
community, rather than confinement.
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Democrat-Gazette warned in 1991: 
“Stacked in centers, youth in trouble 
fall through the cracks.”8 
Just two years prior to that article’s 
publication, a consultant hired by the 
state of Arkansas had recommended 
fewer commitments to state custody 
of low-risk offenders, especially those 
being committed for misdemeanor 
offenses. At the time, about one-third 
of the youth committed to DYS were 
being locked up for misdemeanors. 
As this consultant warned in 1989, 
“Too many youths who could better 
be served in community-based 
treatment” were being inappropriately 
and unnecessarily held in state 
confinement.9 
Moving the clock forward about 
10 years, little had improved. DYS 
continued to be wracked in turmoil and 
its secure facilities were still unsafe. 
A five-part series in the Arkansas 
Democrat-Gazette in 1998, entitled 
“Juvenile Justice: The War Within,” 
chronicled the dangers youth still 
faced in DYS lock-up facilities. Staff 
responsible for the care of youth 
instead abused them. As one parent 
aptly observed, “If you gonna do 
violence on kids, how you gonna teach 
them not to do violence?”10
In 2001, at the Alexander Youth 
Services Center, the state’s largest 
correctional facility,11 two boys 
committed suicide in the same cell 
within six months of each other.12
By 2002, the Civil Rights Division 
of the United States Department of 
Justice had become involved. After an 
investigation, the federal agency found 
that conditions at Alexander violated 
the constitutional rights of youth 
incarcerated at the facility.13
In 2003, state officials entered into 
a settlement agreement with federal 
authorities promising to improve 
the treatment of youth in custody at 
Alexander.
Promises notwithstanding, in 2005, 
a 17-year-old girl suffering with 
blood clots in her lungs died at 
Alexander due to the lack of adequate 
medical care.14 Education and mental 
health services provided to youth in 
custody continued to be inadequate. 
Psychotropic drugs were excessively 
and dangerously used to control youth 
behavior in the institutions.15   
Frustrated with the lack of progress 
the state was making to protect 
youth at Alexander, youth and their 
advocates threatened a federal lawsuit 
in 2007 to address the deteriorating 
and exceedingly dangerous conditions 
at the facility. 
On the Road to Reform
Out of this dark past grew the political 
will to reform. Under the threat 
of being sued, the newly elected 
governor, Mike Beebe, responded to 
the advocates’ planned lawsuit with 
a sincere commitment to change the 
state’s youth justice system.
The Arkansas State Legislature joined 
the call to reform and the Eighty-Sixth 
Assembly enacted Senate Resolution 
31 in 2007, calling for a study of 
ways to improve the state’s juvenile 
justice system and a plan to “reduce 
reliance on large juvenile correctional 
facilities.”16  
Youth Move Arkansas members visiting the Arkansas state capitol.
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opportunity to achieve their true 
potential. He quickly embraced the 
expertise offered from outside of 
government to help build his vision for 
reform.19  
Now at the agency for more than 
four years, he has provided the 
continuity and leadership needed to 
rebuild broken trust and to strengthen 
relationships among the agency’s 
essential partners. Mr. Angel’s skilled 
leadership and government officials’ 
ongoing resolve to fix the system 
have been critical core components of 
reform efforts in Arkansas.
Building the Vision
Under Ron Angel’s leadership, DYS, 
experts, and systems stakeholders 
set out in 2008 to create a plan for 
reform—one that embraced best 
practices in juvenile justice. The 
reformers envisioned a system that 
expanded the use of non-residential, 
community-based supports and 
supervision programs for youth, 
and decreased the use of secure 
confinement.
The work of the group was premised 
on what research repeatedly shows: 
It is more effective and less costly 
to provide youth in trouble—who do 
not pose an immediate or significant 
threat to public safety—with quality 
community-based programs and 
supports, rather than taking them 
away from home and placing them in 
secure confinement.20
To oversee the troubled Division of 
Youth Services, Governor Beebe 
appointed a new director, Ron Angel, 
who immediately began working with 
advocates to create solutions to the 
problems that had haunted the agency 
for decades.  
The Importance of Leadership
Redirection of a sinking ship is no easy 
feat. Perhaps that’s why the Arkansas 
DYS had gone through nine directors 
in a dozen years prior to Mr. Angel 
being given charge of the agency.17
Mr. Angel was surprisingly well-
appointed for the seemingly 
insurmountable task of repairing 
the state’s troubled juvenile justice 
agency, even though he had no prior 
direct experience in the field. Just 
before taking the reins at DYS, he had 
served a tour of duty in charge of his 
unit with the Arkansas National Guard 
in Iraq, and had also retired from 
a career at the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA). 
His experience at the VA included 
working as an internal investigator 
charged with ferreting out fraud and 
corruption in that agency. He often 
worked undercover, on occasion 
posing as a detainee in locked 
institutions. There he saw firsthand 
the negative effects of incarceration 
on human behavior. 
Mr. Angel’s dedication to creating 
alternatives to confinement for 
troubled youth is profoundly informed 
by his personal experience.  “I am a 
firm believer that institutionalization is 
not the answer for most kids,” he said. 
“By institutionalizing people…you can 
teach [them] what you don’t want to 
teach them.”18 
Mr. Angel takes seriously his 
responsibility as DYS director to 
provide all children, even those 
who do bad things, a meaningful 
Mr. Angel’s dedication to creating 
alternatives to confinement for troubled 
youth is profoundly informed by his 
personal experience.
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Also underlying the vision was 
a recognition that incarceration 
is potentially harmful to youth21 
and, as studies have shown, that 
institutionalized youth are more likely 
to reoffend than those placed in a 
community-based alternative.22  And, 
as further demonstrated by research, 
the frequency of reoffending decreases 
as teenagers mature, and the length 
of stay in an institutional setting does 
little to contribute to a reduction in the 
rate of re-offense.23
Building the vision for reform and the 
plan to implement it in Arkansas took 
approximately one year. It involved 
many stakeholder discussions about 
how to best shape the future of youth 
services. Stakeholders examined 
not only what research shows, but 
also juvenile justice practices and 
experiences in Arkansas communities. 
A Strategic Planning Committee meeting at the Winthrop Rockefeller Institute.
Philanthropic Partners Support 
Reform and Help Build Critical 
Collaborations
Philanthropic foundations quickly 
stepped up to support the commitment 
by government officials to work 
in collaboration with the system’s 
strongest critics to reform youth 
services. The JEHT Foundation, Public 
Welfare Foundation, and The Atlantic 
Philanthropies have generously 
invested in the reform process, 
providing the financial support for the 
development of the collaborations 
necessary to bring the state’s 
youth justice system into the 21st 
century. With funds from the JEHT 
Foundation, advocates, poised to sue 
the state, instead hired independent 
juvenile justice experts to examine 
the root causes of the persistent 
problems at Alexander and to make 
recommendations to government 
officials about how to address them.24  
Hearkening back to the consultant’s 
conclusions two decades earlier, these 
experts found 
that the essential 
problem 
underlying the 
state’s juvenile 
justice crisis was 
an excessive 
reliance 
on secure 
correctional 
confinement.25
The experts 
further 
determined that 
many of the 
youth in secure 
confinement did 
not require such 
an expensive and 
restrictive level 
of custody, and 
were being excessively incarcerated 
for minor and non-violent offenses.26
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Most importantly, this collaborative 
report offered solutions to address 
these factors. It included specific 
recommendations about how to reform 
the system to make it more effective, 
less expensive, and better focused 
on providing services that actually 
work to redirect youth from criminal 
involvement. 
The report provided action steps to 
accomplish systems reform in order 
to minimize or eliminate each of the 
factors identified as contributing to 
the overuse of state commitments and 
excessive confinement. 
This report became a galvanizing 
guide for moving forward, providing 
the broad principles that would inform 
the goals of reform. It helped shape 
reform efforts around a common 
understanding of what was wrong with 
the system and what could be done to 
fix it.
The Strategic Plan
Using a facilitated process involving 
representatives of all system 
stakeholders, including judges, 
probation, advocates, service 
providers, prosecutors, parents, 
youth, education, and behavioral 
health services, government leaders 
earnestly set out to develop a plan for 
reform. The Arkansas Division of Youth 
Services Comprehensive Reform Plan 
2009–2014 was completed in June 
2009 and approved by a 50-member 
task force appointed by the division.30
The report concluded that more 
effective, less harmful—and less 
costly—alternatives would better 
serve these youth without risk to 
public safety. In particular, the experts 
recommended that individualized 
community-based rehabilitative 
supports and supervision, instead 
of secure confinement, would better 
serve these youth, and ultimately the 
best interests of the state.27  
In May 2008, national experts, this 
time acting in collaboration with DYS, 
released a jointly prepared report 
entitled, Juvenile Justice Reform in 
Arkansas: Building a Better Future 
for Youth, Their Families, and the 
Community.28 The report identified 
systemic problems, as well as 
operational ones, within the system 
that needed to be changed. 
The report also identified specific 
factors that contributed to the 
state’s overreliance on institutional 
custody.29 These included: 1) system 
fragmentation and lack of coordination 
among DYS, service providers, 
and the courts; 2) inadequate risk 
and needs assessments; 3) too 
few community-based resources 
to provide individualized supports 
and interventions to prevent out-of-
home placements; 4) lack of positive 
behavioral interventions in schools 
to reduce disciplinary referrals of 
minor offenses to juvenile courts; 
5) use of the state juvenile justice 
system to address the mental health 
and substance abuse needs of non-
dangerous youth, needs that could be 
more effectively managed and better 
met with non-custodial interventions 
and supports; 6) use of the 
delinquency system to serve the needs 
of “cross-over” youth, that is, those 
who have suffered abuse and neglect; 
and 7) lack of fiscal incentives that 
favor use of community-based services 
over state commitments.
ARKANSAS YOUTH JUSTICE
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3)  Develop standardized risk and 
needs assessment tools to 
inform judicial decisions and DYS 
placements.
4)  Develop regional DYS advisory 
councils. 
5)  Implement a system of graduated 
responses and an adequate array 
of alternatives to confinement 
statewide.
6)  Increase traditional and 
nontraditional strength-based 
services for youth in their 
communities. 
7)  Expand substance abuse 
treatment programs. 
8)  Strengthen early intervention and 
prevention programs, especially in 
schools.  
9)  Improve data collection and 
analysis. 
 
10)  Increase the system’s capacity 
to provide services in a culturally 
relevant manner and to meet the 
needs of special populations. 
11)  Ensure facilities are safe, humane, 
and treatment-oriented. 
12)  Move toward use of smaller, 
therapeutic regional facilities 
when incarceration is necessary.
13)  Reduce disproportionality in 
the numbers of youth of color 
committed and confined. 
14)  Develop a better system of 
outcome accountability. 
15)  Reinvest dollars saved from 
reduced secure confinement into 
community supports to prevent 
out-of-home placements.
The primary intention of the plan 
was to create a road map to “right-
size” the state’s system, transforming 
it from one that relied excessively 
on harmful secure confinement and 
unnecessary state commitments to 
one that provided youth and families 
with effective community-based 
supports and services to prevent 
out-of-home placement. The plan 
also aimed to guide the way to a 
smarter use of state taxpayer dollars—
reserving the state’s costly secure 
beds for only those youth who need 
to be securely confined because 
they truly present a danger to the 
community. Finally, it called for the 
reinvestment of money saved by the 
reduced use of secure confinement 
into community programs proven to 
be effective at addressing delinquent 
behavior in youth.  
The strategic plan includes numerous 
goals and objectives to achieve its 
purpose: 
1)  Conduct a public information 
and community engagement 
campaign about the goals of 
reform.
2)  Strengthen cooperative 
partnerships necessary to sustain 
reform.
ARKANSAS YOUTH JUSTICE
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Strengthening Core Partnerships
Communications and relationships 
within DYS and among its core 
partners were, not surprisingly, 
seriously damaged by the decades-
long crisis in juvenile justice. Constant 
changes in agency leadership 
exacerbated the problem. Rebuilding 
good communications among core 
partners in the system—DYS, judges 
(and their probation staff), and 
service providers—is essential for 
implementing the vision laid out in the 
strategic plan.  
Over the course of two years, with 
support from the Public Welfare 
Foundation, DYS held a series of six 
regional and statewide meetings to 
build better communication among 
the system’s core partners and to 
strengthen these relationships. 
Dr. Angela Brenton, Dean of the 
College of Professional Studies at the 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 
facilitated the meetings with a focus 
on dismantling the distrust and discord 
within the system that threatened to 
derail reform efforts. DYS leadership 
Outcomes to be achieved are indicated 
in the plan and timeframes for the 
completion of specific tasks are set.
Independent Oversight
The strategic plan calls for ongoing 
oversight of its implementation by an 
independent body to ensure the vision 
of the plan is realized. An independent 
oversight committee was thus created 
in October 2009. It meets quarterly 
and consists of representatives 
from DYS, other child-serving state 
agencies, the Administrative Office 
of the Courts, service providers, 
and probation, as well as advocates, 
parents, judges, and prosecutors. It 
reviews the progress made toward 
achieving the goals and objectives 
of the plan and the timeliness of 
implementation. 
Committee members also help with 
the actual implementation of the 
plan. For example, the committee is 
assisting with the development of a 
regional structure for DYS, including 
the establishment of five regional 
advisory committees. Members of the 
committee play a key role in engaging 
community leaders, families, business 
leaders, and local government officials 
in systems reform, and in developing 
outcome measures for service 
providers under contract with DYS to 
provide community-based treatment 
services. 
The work of this committee is critical 
to ensure the sustainability of reform 
efforts moving forward and to advance 
initiatives that they identify will best 
serve reform goals. 
Judge Wiley Branton, Jr.
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Rebuilding good communications 
among core partners in the system—
DYS, judges (and their probation staff), 
and service providers—is essential for 
implementing the vision laid out in the 
strategic plan.  
also conducted additional meetings 
with juvenile judges around the state.
Over time, these meetings had a 
productive effect in advancing reform 
by bringing together key stakeholders 
to work on the shared goal of creating 
better opportunities for youth in 
trouble in Arkansas.
Communications Strategy 
As another critical step, 
Arkansas reformers developed a 
communications plan to help inform 
the public about the need for change 
and to involve the community in 
reform efforts. 
As part of the communications 
strategy, reformers engaged in a 
process to develop public messages 
and other communications materials 
that reflected the goals and principles 
of reform. With the assistance of an 
Arkansas marketing firm, Mangan 
Holcomb Partners, DYS conducted 
statewide meetings of stakeholder 
groups to test and develop the 
messages of the reform. These efforts 
resulted in the launch of “The Truth of 
Youth” campaign, an initiative aiming 
to make Arkansans more aware of the 
need to reform the state’s juvenile 
justice system.
The communications toolkit developed 
as part of the Truth of Youth campaign 
is designed for use by individuals, 
organizations, and government 
partners to advance reform efforts. It 
includes posters with eight different 
reform messages to hang in public 
places, a PowerPoint presentation 
about the goals and purposes of 
reform, a brochure for distribution at 
public meetings and presentations, 
“elevator speeches” about the need for 
reform and reform goals, drop-in ads 
for community and local newspapers, 
 A message from the Arkansas Division of Youth Services
CADC7 A^U
H^DC7
Change is hard, 
not impossible.
The majority of kids who complete 
community-based programs become 
successful, contributing citizens.
 A message from the Arkansas Division of Youth Services
CADC7 A^U
H^DC7
Community-based programs 
work for kids...
and their communities.
Kids who have participated in effective 
community programs are less likely to
be arrested again.
 A message from the Arkansas Division of Youth Services
CADC7 A^U
H^DC7
Kids learn 
quickly. 
It’s up to us to make the 
lesson positive.
 A message from the Arkansas Division of Youth Services
CADC7 A^U
H^DC7
Good kids will 
make bad choices.
Teenagers sometimes make poor 
choices. That doesn’t make them 
bad people.
Truth of  Youth drop-in ads for community newspapers.
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sample letters to public officials about 
the need for reform, and fact sheets 
about juvenile justice issues and 
reform goals.31
Since the messages are about youth, 
extra effort was taken to ensure that 
young people were involved in the 
development of these materials. Youth 
leaders from Youth Move Arkansas, 
a youth-led organization devoted 
to improving services and supports 
to children and youth of Arkansas, 
provided valuable input, as well as 
some of the photography used in the 
campaign, and in this report.32
Building Community-based Service 
Capacity
As in so many states nationwide, 
youth in trouble in Arkansas are taken 
from their homes and communities 
and committed to state custody 
largely due to insufficient community-
based service capacity. Judges who 
make the hard day-to-day decisions 
about how best to redirect youth who 
break the law say they are too often 
required to place youth in the secure 
custody of the state because there is 
not an adequate array of alternative 
community-based service and 
supervision options.33 A key to reform 
and reducing reliance on commitments 
to state custody, therefore, has been 
the identification of service gaps and 
expansion of community-based service 
capacity.
In partnership with DYS, students at 
the University of Arkansas Clinton 
School of Public Service helped survey 
the gaps in community supports 
for youth and families in several 
key judicial districts in Arkansas. 
In addition, beginning in 2011, the 
state began to require, through its 
contracting process, that community-
based providers collect and analyze 
data for each judicial district they 
serve to determine the needs of 
the district’s youth, and gaps in 
services along the continuum, in each 
community.
As part of the reform efforts, state 
leaders, service providers, judges, and 
legislators also visited community-
based programs with proven track 
records of success in other states. 
Stakeholder delegations from Arkansas 
went to New York, Texas, Illinois, 
Missouri, Ohio, and Louisiana to see 
firsthand successful community-based 
program models, some of which 
were then emulated in Arkansas. For 
example, the Youth Advocacy Program 
(YAP) model, offering effective and 
cost-efficient alternatives to secure 
institutional placements,34 is now being 
piloted by DYS in several communities 
in Arkansas.35  Also, multisystemic 
therapy (MST)—an evidence-based 
program that provides intensive family 
and youth counseling and is proven to 
reduce recidivism36—is now available in 
Arkansas as a result of the intentional 
effort to fill service gaps.  Importantly, 
MST has also been proven to be cost-
effective.37 
Nevertheless, huge gaps in 
community-based service alternatives 
still exist statewide, and some areas 
of the state are much more richly 
resourced with non-state funded 
community supports for youth. 
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“Commitment Reduction” Service 
Provider Contracts
In Arkansas, state funding for most 
residential and community-based 
youth services flows through DYS. 
The state agency then contracts 
out the responsibility to provide 
services—for both committed youth 
and youth at risk of commitment—
to a network of nonprofit service 
providers.39  Historically, contracts for 
these services have not required any 
formal commitment goals or created 
disincentives for reducing state 
  
Investment in What Works
Committed to building the 
infrastructure needed for 
sustainable reform, Governor 
Beebe included funding to expand 
community-based programming 
in his 2010 state budget. He also 
invested $1.7 million of federal 
stimulus funds to create new 
community-based options through 
a fiscal incentives initiative that 
is part of the service provider 
contracting process. In 2011, 
DYS reinvested $700,000 that it 
saved from the reduced reliance 
on residential beds into increasing 
community-based service 
capacity.38 
Governor Beebe speaking at a press conference about juvenile 
justice reform in Arkansas.
Table 1. Offenses Excluded from 
Targeted Reductions
OFFENSE DESCRIPTION
Homicide
Aggravated Assault
Forcible Rape
Arson
Battery, First Degree
Burglary
Kidnapping
Murder
Rape
Robbery (includes Aggravated 
Robbery and Robbery)
Attempted Aggravated Robbery
Attempted Capital Murder
Battery, Second Degree
Sexual Abuse
Sexual Assault, First Degree
Criminal Attempt
Conspiracy to Manufacture 
Controlled Substances
Delivery of Controlled Substance
Possession of a Weapon
commitments through the contracting 
process. 
In 2010, however, DYS implemented 
an innovative initiative in its provider 
contracting process that has been very 
successful in reducing commitments 
to DYS. This “commitment reduction” 
contracting initiative is intended 
to “reduce dependency on secure 
confinement in Arkansas to address 
the needs of youth in trouble and their 
families.”40
Beginning with contracts entered into 
on July 1, 2010, DYS has required 
each service provider to work in 
collaboration with the local juvenile 
court judges in their provider area, 
and other system stakeholders and 
child-serving systems, to more 
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effectively coordinate and use 
available community-based services 
with the stated goal of reducing state 
commitments. The commitment 
reduction contracts specify an 
expected goal of at least a 10% annual 
reduction of state commitments. They 
also provide that if a 20% reduction 
in state commitments is achieved, 
service contractors may then apply 
for an award of new grant funds, 
otherwise unavailable, as an additional 
commitment reduction incentive. 
The contracts specify that service 
providers will not be penalized for the 
commitment of serious, violent, and/
or chronic youthful offenders to DYS. 
More explicitly, the contracts exempt 
from the 10% reduction goal any 
youth committed to DYS by a juvenile 
court for any one of the offenses listed 
in Table 1 (on page 11). (Appendix B 
lists the offenses that were targeted 
for the reductions in fiscal years 2010 
and 2011.)
Judicial districts and service providers 
have been successful in meeting the 
goals set forth in these commitment 
reduction contracts since they were 
implemented beginning on July 1, 
2010. Judicial districts did indeed 
achieve contract goals of reducing 
state commitments by 20% of 
targeted offenses during the contract 
period.
Participation in the System of Care 
and Interagency Coordination
The new DYS service provider 
contracts also imposed important new 
contractual requirements intended 
to enhance coordination of services 
among other child-serving agencies, 
and to improve the outcomes achieved 
for youth at risk of commitment to 
state custody. 
In 2010, for the first time, DYS service 
providers were required to participate 
in the Department of Human 
Services’ System of Care, the state’s 
coordinated network of children’s 
services providing comprehensive, 
integrated, and individualized services 
to Arkansas’ children and families. 
They were contractually required to 
use the System of Care information 
data tracking system and receive 
System of Care “wraparound” 
training.41
The new provider contracts thus 
recognized that providing more 
effective supports for youth depends 
on a community’s more efficient use 
of behavioral health, substance abuse, 
education, vocational, recreational, 
child welfare, and health services 
coordinated through the System of 
Care.42
The suspension, rather than 
termination, of a youth’s eligibility 
for state Medicaid during the period 
of a youth’s commitment to DYS was 
another initiative called for in the 
strategic plan designed to advance 
interagency cooperation. The state 
has now implemented this change in 
policy. Instead of terminating Medicaid 
eligibility upon commitment, the 
state now suspends it until release, 
which prevents excessive and harmful 
delays in the resumption of benefits as 
youth return to the community. While 
implementation of the new policy is 
not yet seamless, it has resulted in 
much greater continuity in the transfer 
of health care, including behavioral 
health care services, at reentry for 
youth.43
Improving Data Capacity and 
Coordination
A primary goal of the state’s reform 
plan is to ensure that policies and 
programs are data driven. The 
systematic collection and analysis of 
data to determine the needs of youth, 
and effectiveness of publicly funded 
services, are essential to ensure that 
state dollars are being spent wisely. 
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Using federal stimulus funds, DYS has 
been able to improve its statewide 
data management system called 
“Rite Track.” Upgrades in the system 
improved its function and reporting 
capabilities. The DYS database system 
has also been integrated with the 
data system used by the state’s child 
welfare agency.  
DYS is committed to the important 
goal of integrating and analyzing 
state juvenile justice data at different 
key points of system contact (arrest, 
detention, juvenile court referrals, 
diversion, petitions filed, adjudication, 
probation, secure confinement, and 
transfer/waiver to adult courts).44  
This commitment to comprehensive 
collection and analysis of data now 
dispersed in several places throughout 
the system promises to significantly 
increase the state’s capacity to make 
better data-driven policy decisions. 
Risk and Needs Assessments
As part of reform, the Administrative 
Office of the Courts (AOC) and DYS 
developed and implemented more 
meaningful assessments to determine 
the individual needs of youth, as well 
as the risk they present to community 
safety, to better inform commitment 
and placement decisions. 
The AOC engaged in a process in 
2009 involving juvenile court judges, 
prosecutors, public defenders, 
probation, and DYS representatives 
to devise an instrument to assess 
youths’ risk and social history factors. 
The Circuit Court Risk Assessment, 
developed through this process, is 
administered by AOC45 and used 
by juvenile judges as a resource 
in delinquency dispositions. The 
assessment is to be completed by a 
juvenile officer prior to delinquency 
disposition and probation or 
aftercare violation hearings if there 
is a recommendation made for DYS 
commitment or a likelihood of a DYS 
commitment at disposition. 
DYS also began using a risk and needs 
assessment on all youth committed by 
juvenile courts to state custody. The 
Youth Level Service/Case Management 
Inventory (YLS/CMI) tool was used 
by DYS beginning in 2008, but was 
not fully implemented for use with 
the entire population of committed 
youth until after implementation of the 
strategic plan in 2009. 
Risk assessments in general have 
been proven to aid in a more accurate 
prediction of future offenses, and the 
YLS/CMI instrument in particular has 
been determined to be among the best 
of 28 tools studied, in terms of factors 
such as having a high predictive 
validity.46, 47
Youth may be scored as being low, 
moderate, high, or very high risk. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of YLS/
CMI risk levels across all commitments 
(for those youth with completed 
assessments) for 2009 through 2011. 
During this timeframe, most youth 
were scored as moderate risk, and no 
youth were scored as very high risk. 
Figure 2 shows the average length of 
stay for 2009 through 2011 by YLS/
CMI risk level, showing the higher the 
risk, the longer time served.
ARKANSAS YOUTH JUSTICE
14 
In addition, in order to inform 
placement decisions, DYS contracted 
with the University of Arkansas for 
Medical Sciences (UAMS) beginning in 
2008 to conduct comprehensive social, 
medical, physical, and mental health 
evaluations on all committed youth, 
most of whom are held in juvenile 
detention facilities awaiting placement 
by DYS.
Length of Stay Matrix
As part of its intake process, DYS 
now calculates a presumptive length 
of stay (LOS) for every youth using 
a matrix that includes a youth’s prior 
offense history, including the severity 
of the prior offenses, as well as 
the committing offense and unique 
characteristics associated with it, such 
as whether aggravating or mitigating 
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“dual jurisdiction” kids, has been 
significantly reduced—down from 62 
such youth in fiscal year 2009 to only 
16 in fiscal year 2011.50 
For the three-year period beginning 
in 2006, the rate at which youthful 
offenders in Arkansas committed a 
new offense was only 27.8%. DYS 
recommitments fell by 15% from 2009 
through 2011.51   
The reform initiatives underway in 
Arkansas are indeed showing great 
promise, and are beginning to prove 
that better outcomes can be achieved 
for Arkansas youth, families, and 
communities. More quantitative 
data are needed to establish the 
actual outcomes over time of specific 
programs on the lives of youth, but all 
indicators thus far are showing good 
results.52 
Youth and their families who have 
been provided access to the new 
community-based programs made 
available through reform efforts offer 
a testament to what can be achieved 
when resources are spent on the right 
supports for youth and their families, 
instead of on the cost of confinement. 
Darlene and Duane, whose stories 
are told on the next page, are two 
representative examples of what has 
been achieved in Arkansas through 
the expansion of effective community-
based services.53 
factors were involved. The matrix 
also scores other risk and needs 
factors, such as the youth’s substance 
abuse history, in order to develop 
a presumptive LOS in DYS custody 
(excluding aftercare).48  This process 
produces a minimum and maximum 
number of months the youth should be 
held before being released or placed 
on an aftercare plan.
The presumed LOS calculated through 
this method becomes the release goal 
for DYS and its service providers who 
will be providing all the residential and 
community-based services to youth 
committed to DYS under contract 
with the agency. Meeting that goal is 
often challenging, as revealed by data 
showing the actual LOS of youth in 
provider placements and the presumed 
LOS as calculated by DYS at the point 
of commitment.
Successes So Far
The reforms underway in Arkansas 
have achieved good results in a 
relatively short period of time.
From 2008 through 2011, 
commitments to state custody are 
down by 20%. Commitments for 
misdemeanor-level offender behavior 
have been reduced 24% during the 
same time period.49   
For the same period, the average LOS 
in state treatment centers is shorter—
it was 216 days in fiscal year 2008, 
and reduced to 175 days in fiscal year 
2011. The number of beds at the 
state’s largest juvenile secure facility, 
the Arkansas Juvenile Assessment 
and Treatment Center, has been 
reduced from 143 to 100. And the 
number of youth committed annually 
to the juvenile justice system who are 
also the responsibility of the state’s 
child welfare system, the so-called 
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Darlene
Now age 18, Darlene attends the University 
of Arkansas at Pine Bluff and works part-
time at a restaurant. But when she was 16, 
Darlene was on a far different course. Caring 
adults and community-based programming 
helped Darlene turn her life around. 
When Darlene was 16, she went in a car 
with several adults to a store. She remained 
in the car while the adults robbed the 
establishment. They were caught, and 
Darlene was adjudicated a delinquent in 
juvenile court. She could have been charged 
as an adult for the crime. 
Darlene was placed on probation by the 
juvenile judge instead. She completed 160 
hours of court-ordered community service 
and was placed on electronic monitoring. 
Darlene also had a drug use problem, 
and repeatedly violated the terms of her 
probation. She broke her curfew and on 
several occasions tested positive for drugs. 
Instead of sending her to DYS, juvenile court 
staff and the service provider worked with 
Darlene to help her mature and break the 
pattern of her destructive behaviors. 
Darlene received outpatient substance 
abuse treatment on probation and enrolled 
in a 10-week adolescent improvement class 
where she learned responsibility and how to 
make better choices. She developed life skills 
such as how to manage a bank account and 
apply for work opportunities. 
Darlene also participated for six months in 
the Youth Advocacy Program (YAP), one of 
the new community-based services that DYS 
is expanding with savings recouped from 
reduced residential costs. In this program, 
Darlene was given a caring advocate who met 
with her weekly and provided a sorely needed 
“listening ear,” “without prejudgment.”54  Also 
as part of YAP, Darlene helped paint over 
graffiti in the city, and completed a summer 
program called “PEACE” (Police Engaging 
Adolescent Character and Excellence). 
Darlene was never committed to DYS or held 
in a DYS secure facility. Due to the supports 
she was given in the community, and her 
personal growth, she is now on the road to 
success.
  
Duane
Duane is 16 years old. He and his family have 
successfully completed the multisystemic 
therapy (MST) program offered to them 
through their community-based service 
provider. The program has helped the family 
resolve the issues that were underlying 
Duane’s problem behavior. 
Prior to participating in the community-based 
MST program, Duane had a two-year history 
of getting into trouble in two states. His 
“delinquent” background included stealing, 
truancy, and defiance at home and school. 
Duane also had a problem with substance 
abuse. Duane was referred to the MST 
program by his probation officer. 
Over the course of five months, MST 
therapists provided multiple weekly intensive 
in-home therapy sessions to Duane and his 
family. At first, Duane’s parents didn’t think 
the program was necessary. They felt that 
their problems with Duane were hopeless. 
But the in-home therapy sessions turned the 
situation around.  
The therapy helped teach Duane’s parents 
how aspects of their parenting contributed to 
the difficulties in the home. It gave them new 
parenting skills that helped them to create an 
effective behavior plan with Duane and the 
confidence to enforce it. 
The conflict in the home decreased. Duane 
now attends school every day, has above-
average grades, and has stopped using drugs 
or alcohol. He is no longer angry or defiant at 
school. And these successes were achieved 
without a secure residential placement.
Plaque at the Pulaski County Courthouse.
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The Road Ahead
In these final sections, the authors 
present six hypothetical scenarios to 
provide some examples of changes in 
policies or practices that might further 
reduce the use of secure confinement. 
The scenarios presented here are 
not intended to be prescriptive or 
exclusive. Rather they are offered 
to aid conversations in Arkansas as 
reform efforts move forward, and 
to give estimates of the potential 
reductions in custody populations if 
changes such as these were pursued. 
The authors intend for the scenarios 
to serve as a tool for stakeholders 
and policymakers in Arkansas. The 
scenarios are presented to provide 
estimates, based on the available 
data, of how many youth might be 
safely diverted from commitment 
in the future were these or similar 
scenarios pursued, thereby allowing 
stakeholders to consider resources 
they may have to redirect toward 
alternative, community-based 
programming.
Following a discussion of various 
trends in demographic and system 
data, we provide estimates of the 
effect that certain proposed changes 
would have on the secure residential 
bed need in DYS and the funds that 
would potentially become available for 
other uses as less is spent on secure 
custody.
Trends Relevant to Future DYS Bed 
Space Needs
The following trends are reported in 
order to provide a backdrop to the 
reform scenarios described below. As 
can be seen here, statistics regarding 
population, reported crime, arrests, 
and commitments are relatively flat 
in Arkansas and, in most cases, have 
dropped consistently in recent years. 
There is no indication that a significant 
change up or down is expected in the 
next several years.
Population and Reported Crime 
Trends
The state population grew 9.1% and 
the youth population (under age 18) 
just 4.6% between the 2000 and 
2010 U.S. Censuses. This represents 
an average annual rise of just 0.5%. 
The overall Arkansas growth rate 
was almost identical to the national 
growth in this period (9.1% vs. 9.7%, 
respectively), while the growth rate of 
the youth population in Arkansas was 
higher than the national change (4.6% 
vs. 2.6%, respectively). 
As shown in Table 2, between 2000 
and 2010, 51 Arkansas counties lost 
youth population while 24 counties 
gained it.
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Table 2. Population Under 18 by Arkansas County, 2000 and 2010
County Judicial District 2000 2010
Percent 
Change County
Judicial 
District 2000 2010
Percent 
Change
Arkansas 11E 5,150 4,425 -14.1% Lee 1 3,277 2,160 -34.1%
Ashley 10 6,491 5,330 -17.9% Lincoln 11W 3,215 2,743 -14.7%
Baxter 14 7,281 7,506 3.1% Little River 9W 3,430 3,137 -8.5%
Benton 19W 40,821 61,848 51.5% Logan 15 5,824 5,491 -5.7%
Boone 14 8,123 8,585 5.7% Lonoke 23 15,188 18,831 24.0%
Bradley 10 2,968 2,681 -9.7% Madison 4 3,817 3,801 -0.4%
Calhoun 13 1,415 1,102 -22.1% Marion 14 3,571 2,983 -16.5%
Carroll 19E 6,080 6,183 1.7% Miller 8S 10,734 10,549 -1.7%
Chicot 10 3,876 2,724 -29.7% Mississippi 2 15,407 13,104 -14.9%
Clark 9E 5,104 4,480 -12.2% Monroe 1 2,862 1,840 -35.7%
Clay 2 4,068 3,590 -11.8% Montgomery 18W 2,174 1,998 -8.1%
Cleburne 16 5,122 5,162 0.8% Nevada 8N 2,509 2,131 -15.1%
Cleveland 13 2,242 2,151 -4.1% Newton 14 2,142 1,736 -19.0%
Columbia 13 6,420 5,594 -12.9% Ouachita 13 7,453 6,145 -17.5%
Conway 15 5,169 5,145 -0.5% Perry 6 2,586 2,402 -7.1%
Craighead 2 19,809 24,141 21.9% Phillips 1 8,513 6,113 -28.2%
Crawford 21 15,032 16,350 8.8% Pike 9W 2,816 2,787 -1.0%
Crittenden 2 15,834 14,809 -6.5% Poinsett 2 6,684 5,959 -10.8%
Cross 1 5,435 4,494 -17.3% Polk 18W 5,174 4,921 -4.9%
Dallas 13 2,410 1,913 -20.6% Pope 5 13,900 14,241 2.5%
Desha 10 4,428 3,377 -23.7% Prairie 17 2,284 1,878 -17.8%
Drew 10 4,832 4,361 -9.7% Pulaski 6 91,210 92,185 1.1%
Faulkner 20 22,006 27,742 26.1% Randolph 3 4,479 4,171 -6.9%
Franklin 5 4,591 4,431 -3.5% Saline 22 21,276 26,139 22.9%
Fulton 16 2,650 2,598 -2.0% Scott 15 2,919 2,883 -1.2%
Garland 18E 18,759 20,093 7.1% Searcy 20 1,873 1,675 -10.6%
Grant 7 4,268 4,315 1.1% Sebastian 12 29,937 31,882 6.5%
Greene 2 9,411 10,590 12.5% Sevier 9W 4,446 5,040 13.4%
Hempstead 8N 6,446 5,878 -8.8% Sharp 3 3,747 3,717 -0.8%
Hot Spring 7 7,608 7,686 1.0% St. Francis 1 8,193 6,677 -18.5%
Howard 9W 3,840 3,623 -5.7% Stone 16 2,557 2,555 -0.1%
Independence 16 8,396 8,792 4.7% Union 13 11,832 10,061 -15.0%
Izard 16 2,768 2,625 -5.2% Van Buren 20 3,487 3,537 1.4%
Jackson 3 4,081 3,734 -8.5% Washington 4 39,492 51,484 30.4%
Jefferson 11W 22,161 18,428 -16.8% White 17 16,376 18,433 12.6%
Johnson 5 5,733 6,329 10.4% Woodruff 1 2,274 1,672 -26.5%
Lafayette 8S 2,174 1,776 -18.3% Yell 15 5,451 5,831 7.0%
Lawrence 3 4,258 3,992 -6.2%
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Figure 3 shows that the overall 
population of youth under age 18 
has grown in the past decade, mainly 
due to an increase in Hispanics and 
in Asian and other races. Both the 
White and African American youth 
populations are dropping.
Figure 4 shows that in 2010 overall 
reported crime in Arkansas was at its 
lowest level in the past decade and 
has dropped each year since 2005. 
Property crime fell 12% from 2005 to 
2010, while violent crime fell 9% from 
2006 to 2010, despite a small rise in 
2008—2009.
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Figure 5 shows that while the arrest 
rate for Arkansas youth has fluctuated 
over the past decade, it has dropped 
over the past three years (2008 to 
2010) and as of 2010 is at nearly its 
lowest point in 10 years—only 2007 
had lower arrest rates than 2010, 
which is the last year for which data is 
reported. The 2010 rates overall, and 
for both property and violent crimes, 
were over a third less than the 2008 
rates.
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DYS Commitment Trends
The number of DYS commitments 
fell over 25% since fiscal year 2009, 
including overall and for felonies and 
misdemeanors. The overall number 
of commitments in fiscal year 2011, 
and in particular the number of 
commitments for misdemeanors, 
were the lowest of the past decade. 
Commitments for misdemeanors 
are almost half what they were in 
2001. Also, misdemeanors now make 
up about a third of commitments, 
whereas 10 years ago they 
represented more than half, as shown 
in Figure 6a.
Figure 6b shows felonies made up 
almost two-thirds and misdemeanors 
over one-third of fiscal year 2011 
commitments.
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shown in Figure 7b for fiscal year 
2011, commitments for property 
offenses are the most common (45%), 
followed by violent (34%), and public 
order offenses (11%).
Figure 7a shows that commitments 
for all types of offenses except 
drug offenses are at five-year lows. 
There has been a particular drop in 
commitments for violent and property 
offenses since fiscal year 2009. As 
ARKANSAS YOUTH JUSTICE
23 
Fiscal year 2011 commitment rates by 
Arkansas judicial district are shown in 
Figure 8.55
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Figures 9a and 9b show that the 
numbers of both girls and boys are 
dropping among commitments, 
and that the proportion of girls has 
risen the past two years after falling 
fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 
2009. Girls accounted for 16% of 
commitments in fiscal year 2011.
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The average age at commitment has 
remained approximately 15.5 years 
since 2007. Figure 10 shows that ages 
at commitment have not changed 
substantially, although there is a 
slight downward trend for 15- through 
17-year-olds and an upward trend for 
the younger ages as well as for ages 
18 and over.
Figure 11 shows that the number of 
White youth committed has dropped 
consistently for five years. African 
American and Hispanic commitments 
rose into fiscal year 2009 but have 
dropped since then. African Americans 
accounted for over half (53%), 
Whites 40%, and Hispanics 6% of 
commitments in fiscal year 2011. 
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African American youth are committed 
at far greater rates than other races 
or ethnicities. The relative rates of 
commitments for fiscal year 2007 
through fiscal year 2011, shown 
in Figure 12, indicate that African 
American youth were over four 
times more likely to be committed 
than White youth in each of the past 
three years.56  Hispanic youth were 
represented at about the same rate as 
White youth. (Asian/Pacific Islander 
youth, Native American, and youth 
in “Other” ethnic groups represent 
less than 2% of the committed youth 
and are generally underrepresented 
relative to their numbers in the 
general population.)
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Hypothetical Future Reform 
Scenarios
The scenario calculations presented 
here represent an effort to estimate 
how the DYS secure custody 
population size would be reduced if 
certain reforms were put into practice. 
• The first scenario analyzes 
the effect on DYS population 
size if commitments for some 
misdemeanor offenses are reduced. 
• The second scenario is a projection 
that illustrates the potential for 
reduction of the DYS population if 
commitment reduction contracts 
are continued and incentives for 
reduced commitments are met.  
• The third scenario explores the 
potential for reducing commitments 
of youth based on risk levels. 
Specifically, it examines the 
potential effect on future DYS 
population size of limiting 
commitments to youth who are 
assessed to be medium- or high-
level risk offenders. 
• The fourth scenario makes 
projections based on a reduction in 
the time spent by youth awaiting 
DYS placement. 
• The fifth scenario projects the 
future average daily population 
assuming a reduction in the length 
of stay (LOS) of youth serving 
time beyond the presumptive term 
established by the DYS LOS matrix. 
• The sixth and final scenario 
projects the effect that reducing 
commitments of low-functioning 
youth unable to meaningfully 
participate in DYS programming 
might have on DYS population size.
Summary of Scenario Methodology
The authors received extensive data 
from several data sources provided by 
DYS to conduct our data analysis and 
projections.57  The authors also had 
extensive communication with DYS 
personnel regarding data definitions 
and interpretation.
Scenario calculations estimate or 
project the DYS committed population 
in the next year based on data from 
fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (or, when 
necessary, extrapolations of the data 
from a shorter time period). When 
historic data trends indicate the 
unlikelihood of significant changes 
in population, arrests, commitment 
rates, or length of stay, as is shown 
in the discussion of trends above, it 
is reasonable to use averages from 
data from a number of recent years 
as a basis for forecasting future 
populations.
All of the scenarios estimate the 
annual average daily population (ADP) 
of committed youth in Arkansas, or 
the percentage change in the ADP that 
can be expected in the coming years, 
if the specified changes are made in 
policy or practice.
The comparative or baseline ADP used 
in the scenarios is the actual ADP over 
the past two fiscal years, which was 
452 youth. The average number of 
commitments in this period was 508 
per year.
The average length of stay in the past 
two fiscal years was 325 days, which 
includes the entire time the youth 
was in custody of the state, from the 
date of commitment to release to the 
community.
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For each scenario, estimates are 
provided of the dollars that could be 
used for alternatives to secure custody 
should the hypothetical reforms be 
implemented. Cost calculations are 
based on figures provided by DYS for 
fiscal year 2010.58  The calculations 
assume the average cost of holding 
a youth in a juvenile detention 
center (JDC) awaiting placement is 
$33,398, in a residential treatment 
center is $78,271, and in a specialized 
residential program is $40,962. The 
scenario cost calculations account 
for the fact that some placements 
are more expensive and others less 
by applying the same distribution of 
youth across these three types of 
settings as in fiscal year 2010, during 
which, on any given day, 16% of the 
committed population was in a JDC, 
66% in a treatment center, and 18% 
in a specialized program.
Please see Appendix A for a more 
detailed discussion of the methodology 
used to produce these scenario 
calculations.
Scenario One: Restructure 
Commitment Criteria for Certain 
Misdemeanor Offenses
Several states have examined the 
advisability of restricting the criteria 
upon which youth may be committed. 
Some states, such as Texas and 
Ohio, have even instituted statutory 
restrictions for juvenile commitments 
to state facilities to offenses that 
would be a felony under the penal 
law.59 In Texas, where funding 
was also appropriated to handle 
misdemeanants in the community who 
otherwise would have been committed 
to state custody, juvenile adjudications 
and revocations substantially declined 
since this restriction on commitments 
was initiated.60
While a blanket exclusion of 
misdemeanants from commitment is 
one possible option for consideration 
in Arkansas, some stakeholders feel 
that this would represent a “one-
size-fits-all” approach, which would 
not sufficiently account for other 
factors that should be considered. 
Considerations regarding the exclusion 
of misdemeanants from commitment 
need to take into account factors that 
might otherwise justify commitment, 
such as multiple committing charges, 
the youth’s arrest and commitment 
history, or the youth’s needs and 
circumstances. 
In acknowledgment of these concerns 
and recognition of the role of the 
juvenile court to make decisions 
that represent the best interest of 
each individual youth, the scenario 
presented here takes into account 
some of these factors. Specifically, this 
scenario would bar misdemeanants 
from commitment as long as they did 
not have prior commitments for felony 
offenses or more than three prior 
commitments (for any offense), and 
their current commitment was not due 
to a revocation of probation following 
release from a felony commitment. 
Misdemeanors coupled with any of 
these factors would qualify the youth 
for commitment. 
If such a restriction on certain 
misdemeanor commitments was put in 
place, the authors estimate that there 
would be 140 fewer commitments 
each year and that the ADP would 
drop 31% to 312, as shown in  
Table 3. This reduction in ADP 
would free approximately $9 million 
for community-based alternatives 
for diverted youth and other 
programming.
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Table 3. Scenario One Findings
Annual 
Commitments
Average 
LOS
Estimated 
ADP
Baseline 508 325 452
Eligible for Commitment 337 337 312
Misdemeanors with additional 
factors* 18 330 16
Felonies 319 338 295
Eligible for an Alternative to 
Commitment
Misdemeanors without 
additional factors*
171 299 140
Estimated ADP (percentage change from Baseline): 312 (-31%)
*Additional factors include a prior felony commitment or four or more prior 
commitments (for any offense). 
Note: Due to rounding, these numbers may be one more or less than the 
actual number of youth.
Scenario Two: Extend 
Commitment Goals of 
Commitment Reduction Contracts
As described earlier in this report, 
in 2010 DYS launched an initiative 
that contractually provides a fiscal 
incentive to reduce the commitments 
of youth unless the most serious 
offense for which they are 
adjudicated delinquent is one of 19 
serious offenses excluded from the 
targeted reductions.
Specifically, a fiscal incentive was 
provided for reducing commitments 
by up to 20% of offenses other than 
those listed in Table 1 on  
page 11. Table 4a below indicates 
that of the 508 annual commitments, 
179 commitments were for offenses 
excluded from the commitment 
reduction contracts and 329 were 
for eligible offenses; the fiscal 
incentive thus applied to reductions in 
commitments for the type of offenses 
associated with 329 commitments. 
Table 4a. Committing Offenses Targeted and Not Targeted by 
Commitment Reduction Contracts, FY 2010 and FY 2011
Average Annual 
Commitments Average LOS Estimated ADP
Total Commitments 508 325 452
Targeted for 20% 
Reduction 329 319 288
Not Targeted 179 335 164
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If this structure were kept in place 
for the next five years, with the goal 
of reducing the commitment of youth 
for offenses not listed by 20% each 
year, the ADP could be reduced to 
259 by fiscal year 2016, as shown in 
Table 4b. This reduction in ADP would 
represent a progressively increasing 
surplus of $3.6 million in fiscal year 
2012 and $12.4 million in fiscal year 
2016.
Table 4b. Scenario Two Findings
Estimated ADP Percent Reduction from Baseline
Baseline (FY10–FY11) 452 --
FY 2012 395 -13%
FY 2013 349 -23%
FY 2014 312 -31%
FY 2015 283 -37%
FY 2016 259 -43%
Scenario Three: Limit 
Commitments to Moderate- or 
High-Risk Offenders based on the 
YLS/CMI Risk Assessment
A key component of reform has 
been increased reliance on objective 
risk and needs assessments to 
inform commitment, placement, and 
treatment decisions. The YLS/CMI 
is now being administered to youth 
entering the system and identifies 
each youth’s level of risk to public 
safety. 
If those youth identified as low risk 
by the YLS/CMI were not committed, 
it is estimated that the baseline ADP 
could be reduced by 44 youth or 12% 
as shown in Table 5. This reduction in 
ADP would disencumber approximately 
$3 million.
Table 5. Scenario Three Findings
Annual 
Commitments Average LOS Estimated ADP
Baseline 499 278 379
Eligible for Commitment 433 283 335
Moderate Risk Level* 323 274 242
High Risk Level* 110 307 93
Not Eligible for 
Commitment
Low Risk Level*
66 241 44
Estimated ADP (percentage change from Baseline): 335 (-12%)
*Assessment data was not available for all committed youth; projected total 
based on 499 youth assessed during fiscal years 2010 and 2011.
Note: Due to rounding, these numbers may be one more or less than the 
actual value.
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Scenario Four: Reduce Delays in 
Assessing Youth While Awaiting 
DYS Placement
Each day spent awaiting placement 
into a treatment setting increases 
a youth’s exposure to the harmful 
consequences of secure confinement 
and postpones the start of services.  
Avoidable delay in placement is, 
therefore, not a wise use of taxpayer 
dollars. In Arkansas, most youth being 
assessed and awaiting placement by 
DYS are currently detained in a county 
juvenile detention center (JDC) using 
beds paid for by the state. 
This scenario projects the effect on 
the overall DYS custody population 
of reducing the time youth spend 
awaiting placement.
The average number of days 
awaiting placement was estimated 
from the number of days each 
youth spent in JDCs leading up to 
their first placement or in between 
placements. Seven youth experienced 
particularly long lengths of stay 
awaiting placement (greater than 100 
days), likely due to circumstances 
not described in the data, such as 
disruptive behavior while awaiting 
placement. These youth did not 
represent the typical juvenile awaiting 
placement and were removed from the 
scenario calculations. The following 
findings are from the remaining 810 
youth committed in fiscal years 2010 
and 2011:
• The average stay awaiting 
placement was 41 days, with a 
range of zero to 99 days. This 
represents a baseline ADP of 45 
youth awaiting placement.
• If DYS was able to reduce this 
41-day LOS awaiting placement to 
10 days, the ADP would drop by 
over 75%, to 11 youth awaiting 
placement. Even if only 80% 
of cases were processed this 
quickly, the ADP of youth awaiting 
placement would fall to 18.
• A reduction to 11 youth awaiting 
placement in JDCs would reduce 
costs for secure custody by 
approximately $1.1 million annually 
while a reduction to 18 youth would 
free approximately $900,000.
Scenario Five: Reduce Presumptive 
Length of Stay as Determined by 
the DYS Matrix
As described earlier, as part of its 
multidisciplinary risk and needs 
assessment performed at the start 
of each youth’s commitment, DYS 
determines the youth’s “matrix 
length of stay” or presumptive 
LOS. The presumptive LOS is DYS’ 
determination of the minimum and 
maximum lengths of time the youth 
should spend in residential placement, 
usually in a secure program prior to 
release to aftercare. 
The presumptive LOS refers to the 
number of days from the start of 
placement to the release to aftercare 
assuming no obstacles arise slowing 
the youth’s progress. (Unlike the 
overall LOS used in most of the 
other scenarios in this report, the 
presumptive LOS does not begin at the 
commitment date but rather begins 
after the intake assessment period.) 
The authors reviewed all cases 
released to aftercare for a five-month 
period, from mid-July through mid-
December 2011. During this period, 
the 102 youth who were released 
to aftercare had been confined an 
average of six days longer than their 
presumptive LOS. Many youth had 
been released prior to their maximum 
release date, while others were 
released after, for a range of 182 days 
early to 744 days late. 
In all, 43 of the 102 youth released 
in this period were held beyond their 
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maximum presumptive LOS. Of 
these 43, eight had notations in their 
records indicating their stay may have 
been extended by a revocation or 
new offense and therefore were not 
included in the scenario analysis; the 
remaining 35, or one-third of youth 
released during this period, were 
included.61
On average, these 35 youth were 
held 67 days past their maximum 
presumptive LOS.
Extrapolating these figures to 
annualized averages, these extended 
stays represent roughly 84 youth 
and add 15 youth to the ADP 
that could otherwise be avoided. 
Releasing these 15 youth within their 
presumptive length of stay would free 
approximately $1 million to be used 
for other purposes.
Scenario Six: Reduce 
Commitments of Youth with an IQ 
under 70
There is consensus among mental 
health clinical professionals conducting 
the mobile assessments of DYS 
youth that youth with a composite IQ 
below 70 are unable to participate in 
cognitively based interventions, which 
represents the programming offered 
at DYS.62  Such commitments to DYS 
secure custody arise, no doubt, out of 
frustration with the lack of other more 
appropriate alternatives. 
A previous survey of 345 youth 
committed to DYS in fiscal year 2006 
revealed that almost 10% had an IQ 
of less than 70.63  In the first part 
of fiscal year 2010, 8% of the DYS 
population on a snapshot day had an 
IQ below 70, and 20% were borderline 
impaired with an IQ between 70 and 
79.64
Based on the 8% rate, if a minimum 
level of cognitive functioning of an 
IQ of 70 or above was a precondition 
of commitment, it is estimated that 
the number of commitments could be 
reduced by 9% to 411, as shown in 
Table 6. This reduction in ADP would 
free $2.9 million, potentially for use 
toward community-based care for 
these youth. More important than a 
reduction in commitments, the needs 
of these youth could be better met in a 
more appropriate treatment setting. 
In addition, professionals at UAMS 
indicate that youth with an IQ 
between 70 and 79 who also have 
a severe language impairment in 
one of the two critical thinking and 
language assessments DYS uses—
Test of Problem Solving (TOPS) 
or the Supralinguistic Index (from 
the Comprehensive Assessment of 
Spoken Language)—are also unable 
to meaningfully participate in DYS 
programming.65
Presumably, a significant number 
of the 20% of youth whose IQ falls 
within the 70–79 range will also have 
language impairments in the range 
that would make them incapable 
of benefitting from traditional 
programming in DYS and appropriate 
candidates for alternative placements. 
If half of youth with an IQ of 70–79 
also score below 70 on the language 
assessments, and if these youth 
were provided alternatives to DYS 
commitment along with those youth 
with an IQ under 70, it is estimated 
that the ADP would drop 19% to 
approximately 365. This would 
represent a combined cost reduction of 
approximately $6.1 million.
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Table 6. Scenario Six Findings
Annual 
Commitments Average LOS Estimated ADP
Baseline 508 325 452
Eligible for 
Commitment
Not Impaired
467 320 411
Eligible for an 
Alternative to 
Commitment
Impaired (IQ 
less than 70)
41 377 42
Estimated ADP (percentage change from Baseline): 411 (-9%)
Note: Due to rounding, these numbers may be one more or less than the 
actual number of youth.
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Davon Donn, Youth Move Board of  Directors (far right), 
on a visit to the state capitol. 
Conclusion and 
Recommendations
Everyone working to improve the 
opportunities offered to youth in 
trouble in Arkansas has made great 
strides since the concerted effort to 
reform the juvenile justice system 
began. This important work is ongoing 
and will, no doubt, continue to bear 
positive results for Arkansas youth, 
their families, and communities. 
To further reduce the potentially 
harmful and costly use of secure 
confinement, the authors urge 
stakeholders and policymakers in 
Arkansas to review the hypothetical 
scenarios in this report to determine if 
implementation of policy and practices 
consistent with them will help 
better serve families and youth. As 
demonstrated by the data, changing 
practices in a manner consistent 
with these scenarios can result in 
measurable savings in the human 
and fiscal price of incarceration in 
furtherance of the goals of Arkansas’ 
juvenile justice reform plan.
These hypothetical scenarios, of 
course, do not represent the only 
potential changes in practice and 
policy that will further reduce the use 
of secure confinement. 
Dollars saved from the reduced use 
of secure confinement must continue 
to be reinvested into effective 
community-based alternatives 
to sustain reform over time. The 
enactment of new policy measures 
that support greater flexibility and 
local input into the expenditure of 
state funding for youth services might 
also help further expand community-
based capacity, thereby reducing local 
reliance on more costly state custody. 
Together, leaders in Arkansas have 
built a solid foundation and structure 
for reform. The changes they set 
out to achieve are firmly underway. 
The authors hope this report fairly 
represents the hard and impressive 
work of the Arkansas reformers and 
provides a vehicle to advance reform 
efforts in the future.
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Appendix A
Scenario Projection Methodology
This appendix describes the 
methodology used in the scenario 
calculations, as well as related issues. 
Each scenario describes how the 
population of DYS committed youth 
held in secure custody might be 
reduced if a specific change was made 
regarding which youth are committed, 
how long they are held, or how their 
cases are handled during their stay. 
Youth targeted by each scenario are 
identified based on the characteristics 
of youth committed over the past two 
fiscal years, for example, the number 
of youth committed for misdemeanors 
(and related data) over the past two 
years are used to estimate the number 
of youth considered in Scenario One.
The result of the calculations for 
each scenario can be considered 
an estimate of the committed 
population in fiscal year 2012, or as 
an estimate of how the past year’s 
commitment data would be different 
had the hypothetical scenarios been 
implemented. 
The decision to place a youth in secure 
custody requires a careful review of 
many factors, only a few of which 
could be culled from available data and 
included in these scenario calculations. 
In order to maximize their usefulness 
despite this challenge, the scenario 
calculations sometimes include a range 
of factors that are likely to influence 
the commitment decisions, such as 
a youth’s prior history with DYS, or 
the calculations may simply assume 
that not all, but just 80% of youth 
eligible, will actually be impacted by 
the reform. These considerations of 
the factors impacting the decision to 
commit are meant to acknowledge 
that DYS system personnel and 
stakeholders, and DYS policies and 
practices, will continue to take into 
account individual differences among 
youth and among cases. In other 
words, a blanket or “cookie cutter” 
approach to commitment exclusions is 
not realistic and is not recommended 
here. Further, in calculating the impact 
of the hypothetical reform scenarios, 
it is not possible to fully account for 
the complexities of each individual 
case and, indeed, that is not the 
intention of this report. Rather, the 
authors attempted to use the best 
available data to disaggregate youth 
into reasonable clusters of youth likely 
to be eligible and not eligible for each 
scenario.
Average Daily Population
The number of youth who are held 
in a system on any given day of 
the year is called the average daily 
population (ADP). ADP is a function 
of two main factors: the number of 
youth entering or committed to the 
system and the total number of days 
they are in custody or length of stay 
(LOS). Estimates of future custody 
populations or bed space needs, 
therefore, are typically based on 
estimates of how many youth will be 
admitted (“commitments”) and how 
long they will stay (“LOS”). 
In this report, each scenario begins 
with the baseline or status quo ADP 
based on the rate of commitment 
and average LOS from the last two 
complete fiscal years, 2010 and 2011. 
This baseline ADP of 452 approximates 
the ADP that would be expected over 
at least the next year if no changes in 
policy or practice are put into place. 
(As discussed in the data trends 
section, no significant shifts in system 
statistics are expected in the near 
term.)
The formula applied for the baseline 
ADP and for each of the scenarios 
is as follows:  ADP equals Number 
of Commitments multiplied by LOS 
divided by 365 days. In the case of 
the baseline ADP: (508 X 325) / 365 = 
452.
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Length of Stay
The average LOS for those youth 
who would still be committed after 
excluding certain types of youth 
from commitment is estimated 
based on, again, youth with similar 
characteristics released in the past two 
fiscal years. 
Future LOS is particularly difficult to 
estimate, as it is a function of many 
factors that are not predictable at 
the time of commitment. Still, just 
as the latest trends in commitments 
are the best predictors of future 
commitments, the latest LOS trends 
are the best predictors of future 
LOS. LOS calculations are based on 
releases in a given time period rather 
than commitments, since many youth 
committed during fiscal year 2011 
have not yet been released, so their 
LOS cannot yet be measured. LOS in 
this report does not include pre-trial 
detention. For Scenarios One and 
Two, the full LOS from commitment 
to release to the community is used.  
For Scenarios Three, Five, and Six, 
the LOS from placement to release 
to community is used; the time from 
commitment to placement (also 
known as time awaiting placement 
or intake assessment, usually served 
in a JDC) is not included because the 
scenario requires that the youth is first 
assessed before a custody decision 
is made. For Scenario Four, only time 
awaiting placement is considered.
LOS reported here may not exactly 
correspond to LOS reported elsewhere. 
This could be due to several factors, 
including but not limited to the specific 
period under study, the specific cohort 
of youth under analysis, and the 
source and completeness of the data. 
Also, length of stay can be measured 
in many smaller increments, such as 
the time in each placement or program 
setting, or the time in placement 
minus the time spent in such short-
term settings as acute psychiatric care 
or a hold awaiting new placement.
Many factors influence each youth’s 
actual LOS, of course, including 
the type and seriousness of the 
committing offense, the history 
of the youth’s involvement with 
the system, decisions as to the 
appropriate sentence length, the 
youth’s responsiveness to the services 
offered and other behavior while in 
custody, the efficacy of the service 
provision, and the efficacy with which 
the youth is processed through the 
various stages of the system. For the 
purposes of these scenarios, some of 
these factors are an explicit part of the 
calculations, but others are indirectly 
addressed by identifying LOS for 
youth grouped according to common 
characteristics. 
Costs associated with the scenarios are 
based on annualized costs in each type 
of placement provided by DYS66 and 
reported in the scenario section above. 
Basing the JDC and placement costs 
on the ADP provides, in effect, an 
average across the various lengths of 
stay, allowing the authors to estimate 
the dollars potentially freed through 
each scenario by simply multiplying 
the difference between the baseline 
ADP and the reduced ADP (were the 
scenario implemented) by the average 
cost per youth. Calculations only 
consider the type(s) of placement 
impacted by each scenario. Therefore, 
calculations for Scenarios One and Two 
include all three settings according to 
the 2010 proportions. For Scenarios 
Three, Five, and Six, the JDC cost was 
not included in the discount, since 
there may still be costs associated 
with caring for youth until they are 
assessed and their risk level or IQ 
determined. Treatment center and 
specialty program costs are again 
split according to their proportions 
among all youth in residential care in 
FY 2010 (79% JTC, 21% specialty). 
Scenario Four addresses time awaiting 
placement and thus considers only JDC 
costs.
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Appendix B
Offenses Eligible for Incentives in Commitment Reduction Contracts, 
FY 2010–FY 2011
Offense Description n
Theft of Property 133
Battering—3rd Degree (includes Domestic) 75
Terroristic Threatening—1st or 2nd Degree 60
Possession Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia 44
Criminal Mischief—1st or 2nd Degree 44
Disorderly Conduct/Public Intoxication 43
Sexual Assault—2nd, 3rd, or 4th Degree 38
Breaking or Entering / Criminal Trespass 37
Theft by Receiving 32
Absconding or Escape—1st, 2nd, 3rd Degree 24
Aftercare Violation 20
Resisting Arrest or Fleeing 19
Assault—2nd or 3rd Degree 17
Harassment / Harassing Communications 8
Obstructing Governmental Operations 7
Unauthorized Use Of A Vehicle 6
Assault Family or Household Member—1st, 2nd, 3rd Degree 5
Public Sexual Indecency / Indecent Exposure 4
Criminal Contempt 4
Shoplifting 4
Terroristic Act 3
Furnishing Prohibited Articles 3
Forgery—1st or 2nd Degree 3
Failure To Appear 3
Revocation of Probation 3
Other 19
Total 658
Note: “Other” includes two each for False Imprisonment—2nd degree, Carrying Certain 
Prohibited Weapons, Interfering with Law Enforcement Officer, Communicating False 
Alarm, Vandalism; one each for Child Sex Offender Fail to Register, Endangering Welfare Of 
Minor—2nd Degree, Sell or Possession of Obscene Film, Stalking Second Degree, Attempt 
to Influence Public Servant, Criminal Impersonation, Failure to Stop After Accident With 
Injured or Dead, Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card, Littering 1st Offense.
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